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Abstract 
Principles of fairness and solidarity in AI ethics regularly overlap, creating 
obscurity in practice: acting in accordance with one can appear indistinguishable 
from deciding according to the rules of the other. However, there exist irregular 
cases where the two concepts split, and so reveal their disparate meanings and uses. 
This paper explores two cases in AI medical ethics – one that is irregular and the 
other more conventional – to fully distinguish fairness and solidarity. Then the 
distinction is applied to the frequently cited COMPAS versus ProPublica dispute in 
judicial ethics. The application provides a broader model for settling contemporary 
and topical debates about fairness and solidarity. It also implies a deeper and 
disorienting truth about AI ethics principles and their justification. 
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Contemporary artificial intelligence analyses of human skin lesions are producing 
an unusual combination of medical device efficacy, and patient vulnerability. The 
combination will be explored to disentangle two principles routinely knotted 
together in AI ethics: fairness and solidarity.  
 
The disentangling is required precisely because it makes a practical difference so 
rarely. In most situations, the application of one principle leads to nearly the same 
outcome as applying the other, and the congruence creates a natural obliviousness to 
the two concepts’ difference. Even the fact that there are distinct definitions easily 
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goes unperceived. So, the initial difficulty with the split between fairness and 
solidarity is that it barely exists. In the case of artificial intelligence and skin cancer, 
however, it will exist, and lethally. 
 
2. The principles of fairness and solidarity 
Fairness traces back to Aristotle’s definition as equals treated equally, and unequals 
treated proportionately unequally (Aristotle 1934: Book 5:3:13). Two comparable 
patients similarly threatened by cancer should receive parallel access to medical 
care and, by the same logic and with the same vigor, patients suffering dissimilar 
threats receive divergent care. Fairness imposes equality, and inequality. 
 
Solidarity is inclusiveness and the demand that no one be left behind. Operationally, 
the principle distributes the maximum advantage to the most disadvantaged, to those 
who have least. The ideas of “justice” and “social justice” can adhere to this 
concept, joined more recently by the term “equity.” Regardless, the underlying logic 
is inclusion: if the resources available to screen for skin cancer are limited, their 
distribution will be tilted toward those who normally have the least access to 
medical services.   
 
There is a tipping point question in the ethics of solidarity: How much should the 
privileged sacrifice so that no one gets left behind? The American philosopher John 
Rawls responded with this principle: the greatest benefit must always go to the least 
advantaged (Rawls 1971: 302), which is different from all benefit. So, 
breakthroughs in medical AI will be distributed to benefit everyone, but mostly to 
benefit the underserved. It follows that Rawls does not automatically promote pure 
equality in the sense of everyone ultimately receiving exactly the same medical 
service, but he leans in that direction because the underserved are constantly 
receiving disproportionately more access.  
 
A stronger imperative to inclusion emerges from French writer Simone de 
Beauvoir’s Who Shall Die? (1983/1945) where she envisions a town under wartime 
siege, facing the rising dilemma of insufficient supplies to feed everyone. Instead of 
divvying out the remaining rations to at least some citizens, perhaps the hungriest or 
weakest, the town decides to collectively launch a suicidal attack on the enemy. At 
the extreme, solidarity means that if one must die, all do. No one left behind. 
 
Beyond the definitions, what is significant about fairness and solidarity is that while 
the principles frequently overlap, they can also diverge, with the implication that 
fairness accompanies the injustice of failed solidarity, or solidarity coexists with 
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unfairness. The distribution of a medical service by lottery, for example, is fair since 
all patients have an equal opportunity for treatment, but it fails solidarity since some 
are left behind, untreated. 
 
3. Cases 
Real experiences in AI ethics present more nuanced examples. The cases in this 
paper’s background were produced by a team of philosophers, computer scientists, 
doctors, and lawyers organized out of the Frankfurt Big Data Lab in Germany 
(Brusseau 2020). The group approaches AI-intensive startup companies to 
collaboratively explore their experiences in technological development, and then 
reacts with a discussion and written report. Attention splits between ethics, 
technology, law and medicine (Zicari et al 2021a, Zicari et al 2021b). 
 
Our skin lesion case started at the German Research Center for Artificial 
Intelligence (DFKI) and with a team led by Andreas Dengel. They developed an 
explainable AI in dermatology product – exAID – which translates machine 
learning outputs into human medical language. The underlying diagnosis is 
produced from skin lesion images processed by a neural network and converted into 
a probability that the lesion is cancerous. What exAID adds to the raw number is an 
explanation of which specific qualities in the image contributed to the AI finding. 
Along the development’s way, an unusual, twin bias emerged. The image analyzing 
technology functions better on lighter skin, which immediately raises questions 
about data and algorithmic bias converting into racial discrimination. However, it is 
also true that skin cancer is more prevalent among the lighter skinned, so the 
imbalances are parallel: the AI discriminates, but the disease also discriminates, and 
in the same direction (Zicari et al. 2021b).  
 
The second case is Danish and documents a more conventional arrangement of 
medical service distributed unevenly. A group led by Stig Nikolaj Blomberg 
(Blomberg et al. 2021) formed an AI startup to analyze frantic 112 calls – 
Denmark’s 911 – for humanly imperceptible clues suggesting that the subject was 
suffering cardiac arrest. When perceived, the machine alerted a dispatcher to send a 
specially equipped ambulance. Because the essential process was natural language 
processing, disparities could be predicted: accents, dialects, and native language 
differences might affect diagnostic accuracy at the cost of linguistic minorities. 
Blomberg reported that Swedish and English speakers were well represented in the 
training data, alongside the native Danish, but in cosmopolitan Copenhagen, it is 
difficult to account for every verbal expression (Zicari et al. 2021a). The result is an 
unequal distribution of healthcare across a population of callers in equal jeopardy. 
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4. Fairness and solidarity and skin cancer 
The skin cancer recognition technology is an edge case in fairness because it 
presents a bias that is offset by the same difference originally causing the disparity: 
the lighter skinned are more likely to be correctly diagnosed for a disease that 
infects them more frequently than the darker skinned. Counterintuitively, the AI is 
fair not despite the fact that it is more sensitive for one race than another, but 
because of the disparity. The imbalanced logic starts from the empirical inequality 
in melanoma: the lighter and darker skinned – whites and blacks in racial terms – 
are unequally susceptible to the lethal cancer. The corresponding ethical imperative 
is unequal treatment, which is received in the form of technological performance 
biased toward the lighter end of the skin-tone continuum. So, unequals are treated 
unequally, the definition of fairness. 
 
In this edge case, technical bias is not an obstacle to ethical fairness, it is ethical 
fairness. 
 
Going forward, there are decisions to be made. As our group noted in our report, 
any medical device that functions disparately across races or genders will encounter 
questions about whether resources should be reallocated to eliminate treatment 
differences. Strictly within the AI ethics of fairness, the response is no. Engineers 
should keep developing as they are, using available data to improve the diagnostic 
capacities of their digital tools along the established line of imbalanced treatment 
corresponding with uneven vulnerability. Sensitivity (the detection of malignancy) 
and specificity (the ratio of true alerts against false alerts) will improve along the 
entire skin-tone spectrum, without closing the racial quality gap.    
 
Solidarity is different. The value of leaving no one behind closes the gap, and will 
do so even at the cost of healthcare treatment overall. The direct route is to devote 
the most resources to those who have least, the advantage to the disadvantaged. 
Engineers will need to reorient their efforts to improve diagnostic performance for 
the image analysis as applied to the under-served, the darker skinned. Theoretically, 
the unbalanced refining could continue until the diagnostic equipment comparably 
serves all those across the racial spectrum. The goal would be equal treatment for all 
potential patients. Here, however, the equality is unfair: unequals are treated equally 
in the sense that the more vulnerable and the less vulnerable are protected to the 
same degree by the AI. 
 
Using Edge Cases to Disentangle Fairness and Solidarity in AI Ethics      5 
 
As a practical matter, pure solidarity is impossible because in the real world a 
medical device must first work for some one person before service can expand to 
apply equally to everyone. Still, the ideal can be pictured as a thought experiment. 
Just as de Beauvoir’s citizens agreed that if one must die, all must, so too in the case 
of AI analysis of dermatological images, the theoretical case could be made that 
until the machine works equally well for everyone, it should be used by no one. 
 
Details are important. If fairness and solidarity demand specific and distinct 
allocations of resources, how can those disbursements be measured? Of what are 
they composed? What do the two principles actually mean for medicine and one or 
another skin-toned patient? Part of an answer involves training data: since whites 
are more likely to suffer the disease, it is unsurprising that more images have been 
taken of lighter skin and added to the image sets used to instruct pattern-recognition 
technology to discern cancer. This partially explains why today’s machines function 
better on the light end of the skin spectrum (Zicari et al. 2021b). To the extent that 
training data correlates with model performance, it follows that a lever exists to 
adjust the fairness and solidarity balance. Crudely, the case could be made that 
resources should be expended to gather pictures of lighter-skinned lesions at a 
proportion greater than those gathered for the darker-skinned, and at the same rate 
of difference as the risk of the disease. Unequals would be treated unequally by 
counting pictures. Or, the data could be tilted toward solidarity by capturing more 
darker-skin images, perhaps to the point where all six of the scientifically delineated 
skin types on the Fitzgerald scale are equally represented in the picture set. This 
way, no one is left behind. Either way, the critical point is that being fair happens 
without solidarity, and solidarity is achieved without fairness. 
 
5. Fairness and solidarity and cardiac arrest 
The cardiac arrest recognition case also intersects with fairness and solidarity, but in 
terms of language and nationality, instead of skin and race. More significantly, 
fairness and solidarity overlap in Copenhagen instead of diverging.  
 
The potential subjects of cardiac arrest at the center of the monitored phone calls 
are, as patients, equals: whether they speak Danish or Polish or Arabic is not 
material to their cardiac health. Unlike the case where skin color and skin cancer 
link intrinsically, here speech distinctions can neither justify nor preclude treatment 
differences. So, with the equality established as cardiac health irrespective of 
linguistic condition, the treatment must also disregard language, and that is a 
problem for Blomberg and his team if they want to be fair. As our group reported: 
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Non-native speakers of Danish may not have the same outcome. Swedish and 
English speakers were well represented in the training data but the concern is 
that the training data may not have a diverse enough representation (Zicari et al. 
2021a). 
Equal patients receive unequal treatment from an artificial intelligence that helps 
speakers of some languages more than others. International visitors and immigrant 
communities are two potential sources of locally uncommon speech, but regardless 
of the origin, the conclusion is that the cardiac arrest AI is unfair to comparable 
patients when the words of some are well-recognized while others are mechanically 
garbled. 
 
Solidarity reaches the same conclusion, but by a different route. Instead of the logic 
of equality, it is the imperative to inclusiveness that demands the natural language 
processing be re-weighted to distribute the most to those who have least: if no 
patients are going to be left behind, the AI must expand toward understanding the 
languages of them all, even the rarest and most remote. Stronger, it is because of 
rarity and remoteness that the speech’s priority elevates. As we noted in our report:  
There is a risk that the AI system does not work equally well with all ethnic 
groups. It works best with Danish-speaking callers. It actually has a lower 
degree of being able to handle caller diversity than the dispatchers, who 
sometimes speak several languages. Thus, ethnic minorities would be 
discriminated against. (Zicari et al. 2021a) 
What is most remarkable about the evidentiary blockquote just above is that it could 
be switched with the blockquote in the preceding paragraph, and with no practical 
difference.  
 
The switch would pass unperceived because the overlap between fairness and 
solidarity in this case – as in many cases – is nearly complete both in terms of what 
triggers ethical attention (the technology serves some users better than others), and 
in terms of a practical response (the technology’s usefulness expanded to balance 
performance across diverse populations). What should be underlined, though, is 
neither the common trigger nor the common response, but instead the difference 
hidden between the two similarities: the reason for linguistically expanding the AI 
training. The solidarity reason is not based on equality, but on inclusiveness. And 
that distinction remains, even while also remaining practically invisible. Two people 
could work hand in hand to expand the machine’s language perceptiveness, and 
both be motivated by ethics without realizing their ethics were plural, even 
unrelated. Sitting together, neither would realize their separation. 
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Ultimately, pragmatism trumped theoretical purity and the Copenhagen AI was 
optimized for the languages commonly heard there. In order to provide maximum 
help with limited resources, some people were treated unfairly while also suffering 
from a lack of solidarity, and all the while the difference between the two ethical 
concepts remained virtually imperceptible. What the skin lesion case showed, 
contrastingly, is that even though fairness and solidarity may frequently be a 
distinction without a difference, it is still a distinction, and it can make a difference.  
 
6. Fairness and solidarity and COMPAS and ProPublica 
Clear and distinct definitions of fairness and solidarity make a difference in the 
iconic AI ethics dispute (Bartneck et al. 2021) between the Northpointe software 
firm and the ProPublica social activist organization. Northpointe’s Correctional 
Offender Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions (COMPAS) algorithm 
produces a score between 1 and 10 predicting whether a defendant currently facing 
criminal charges will go on to be arrested for yet another crime if released from jail. 
The score helps judges determine whether defendants should be freed on bail 
pending trial.  
 
To govern the predictions in a racially diverse environment, COMPAS employed 
classical fairness: white and black defendants who were equally likely to commit 
another crime if released were assigned an equal score. Those unequally likely to 
reoffend were assigned proportionately unequal numbers.  
 
ProPublica advocated for an advantage to be distributed to the disadvantaged, and 
the strategy took form within an initial imbalance in the set of defendants. Blacks 
reoffend at a higher rate than whites, so relative to the population of those predicted 
to recidivate, a larger proportion of blacks than whites is correctly predicted to 
reoffend and so denied release from jail, and a larger proportion is incorrectly 
predicted to reoffend and so also denied release from jail. The split attracted 
ProPublica’s attention toward one imbalance (larger percentage of blacks 
incorrectly jailed), and away from the other (larger percentage of blacks correctly 
jailed).  
 
Concretely, distributing an advantage to the disadvantaged started by locating the 
disadvantaged. In the environment of defendants, that corresponded with the 
merciless reality of those jailed even though they would not have reoffended, and 
within that group, as ProPublica documented, blacks suffered harsher treatment 
from the courts than whites in the sense of being unnecessarily jailed at a higher 
rate. (The degree of disparity changes when measured between racial groups, or 
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against the entire population of those needlessly held, but the fact of the disparity 
remains.) From there, ProPublica proposed that the number of black defendants 
needlessly jailed be limited to the lower proportion established by white defendants. 
Statistically and practically, there are a number of different calculations for 
implementation (Sahil and Rubin 2018), but conceptually, the adjustment is not 
difficult: black defendants predicted by the COMPAS algorithm to reoffend are 
freed until the number of false positives (defendants predicted to reoffend who do 
not) drops to match the level set by whites. The result is inclusion in the sense that 




Figure 1. These tables are conceptually correct, though the specific numbers are in dispute (Barenstein 2019).  
The specific numbers are provided to present a sense of the scale of the ProPublica study, and its general results. 
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If implemented, the ProPublica strategy projects two results: release for many black 
defendants whose criminal profiles match imprisoned whites, and balanced 
suffering for those blacks and whites unnecessarily imprisoned.  
 
This is blatantly unfair, but also exemplary solidarity. It is unfair because equals – 
black and white defendants with the same criminal profile – are treated unequally. It 
is solidarity because the entire system is attuned to those who are disadvantaged, 
and to provide that group with an advantage, which is the minimization of 
unnecessary imprisonment down to the point where no one group is left behind. 
This solidarity is the true goal of ProPublica, as they state in one of their written 
exchanges with the COMPAS providers: “The whole point of due process is 
accuracy to prevent people from being falsely accused. (Angwin and Larson 2016)” 
 
Orienting justice to advantage the disadvantaged by preventing false accusations 
and unnecessary imprisonment is a noble goal, but it has nothing to do with fairness. 
With respect to fairness, there is no difference between optimizing so that no one 
who is innocent is imprisoned, and optimizing so that no one who is guilty goes 
free. All that matters is that the rules for deciding who goes where are equally 
applied. For solidarity, by contrast, equal application – and the logic of equality 
itself – is either irrelevant or counterproductive. What matters is only that those who 
are in the worst position receive the most help.  
 
Finally, resolving the Northpointe and ProPublica dispute requires two inseparable 
sentences: Northpointe advocates fairness in incarceration ethics, and ProPublica 
advocates solidarity. Between the two, there is no intrinsically right or wrong 
choice. 
 
7. Fairness and solidarity untangled 
It is definitely wrong, however, to imagine that Northpointe and ProPublica are 
involved in an ethics debate. Debating implies sharing a set of common 
presuppositions on which disagreements are presented, and there is no common 
ground here: what counts as ethics, what the word means, is localized distinctly on 
each side. The reasons – and the kind of reason – guiding decisions about recidivism 
and incarceration are literally incomprehensible from one to the other. 
 
It is common in AI ethics today to find the COMPAS and ProPublica approaches to 
recidivism characterized as “incompatible” (Rudin et al. 2020), or as “mutually 
exclusive” (Hao and Stray 2019) or as “competing and incompatible” (Rahwan et al. 
2019). These descriptions are only slightly imprecise, but the imprecision’s effects 
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are expansive. Instead of incompatible, the two ways of doing ethics are 
incomparable. They are not like rain and snow, they are like rain and Mondays. 
Sometimes you have rain, sometimes you have Monday, sometimes you have both 
overlapping, and other times neither. In AI ethics, we frequently have fairness and 
solidarity together, but not because the two concepts are similar, instead, only 
because they overlap: they both function in about the same way at about the same 
time and with about the same material. This describes the cardiac arrest case in 
Denmark. In other cases, we have fairness without solidarity, which occurred in the 
skin lesion example, and in the COMPAS algorithm. Still other times, we have 
solidarity without fairness, which occurred in the ProPublica objection to COMPAS. 
In any case, and in every case, what must be escaped is the presupposition that 
either fairness or solidarity includes or excludes the other. They are neither 
compatible nor incompatible because they are neither the same nor different. 
 
When that presumption of incompatibility is escaped, fairness and solidarity come 
untangled. They may be discussed clearly because they are understood entirely 
distinctly. This clarity and distinction is beneficial as it provides neat resolutions to 
disputes in AI ethics. Like all truths, however, it is also dangerous because there is 
no way to limit what it reveals. 
 
8. Conclusion 
The Northpointe COMPAS versus ProPublica dispute is not a problem, it is a 
solution. It solves the problem of fairness and solidarity tangled together in AI 
ethics by presenting a case where it is impossible to reconcile the principles, and 
also impossible to use one to exclude the other. Like the skin lesion case, the 
paradox of two concepts that are neither the same nor different ultimately forces a 
string of positive understandings. First there are the independent understandings of 
what fairness and solidarity mean, and then there comes the understanding about 
understanding, which is that no adjudication exists for them: there is no way to 
privilege one or the other with reasoning that appeals to both sides because they 
respond to disparate logics, to equality, or to inclusiveness. Between, there is only 
the reality that neither one makes sense to the other.  
 
Tolerating this incomprehension will be unnatural for mainstream AI ethics, 
partially because of the composition of contemporary participants. The collection of 
those doing AI ethics today resembles our members organized from the Frankfurt 
Big Data Lab in weighing heavily toward computer scientists. Having worked with 
them, one observation is not surprising: their ethical methods resemble machine 
learning practices. In machine learning, knowledge starts as accuracy, like a 
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prediction of cardiac arrest generated from speech patterns. Then, it advances by 
increasing breadth and depth. This is a wider data pool, more words, dialects and 
languages recognized and incorporated into ever deeper understanding registered as 
the algorithmic prediction’s narrowing accuracy. Transferred from computer science 
to ethics, this funneling model for truth frequently works. It does in the cardiac 
arrest case where linguistic breadth and predictive accuracy swirl together with 
fairness and solidarity: more emergency telephone calls recorded and added to the 
machine learning for training equals increased accuracy, equals more fairness, 
equals more solidarity. Ideally, and at the end of knowledge and ethics, there is a 
machine that recognizes the words of all languages, and unerringly identifies every 
cardiac arrest, and for those reasons it is completely fair, and entirely just. We may 
never get there, but that is the destiny. Because more learning equals more knowing 
– just as more data equals more accuracy – the structure of learning itself is built to 
eliminate areas of incomprehension. The elimination is what learning does. 
 
This explains why so many papers have been written in academic journals and 
presented to computer science conferences about COMPAS and ProPublica. The 
logic of the debate frustrates the methods of the debaters. Because the dispute is 
incomprehensible by nature, every attempt to extend broadly and gather the debate’s 
ethical approaches into a single understanding can only fail, and therefore require 
still more expansive study allowing still deeper investigating. Already, computer 
scientists have broadened their considerations to include an eye-popping twenty-one 
separate definitions of fairness in the attempt to account for everything circulating 
through fairness and solidarity ethics, and even that is not enough, more definitions 
are being added (Verma and Rubin. 2018, Narayanan 2018: 00:54:00). Whether this 
circle is virtuous or vicious is not clear, but it is endless.  
 
Out on the edges of ethics and artificial intelligence there is a different experience. 
Fairness and solidarity diverge, and getting closer to one means getting further from 
the other. Understanding one confuses the other. Ultimately, the splitting culminates 
and the two principles are no longer comparable, which is beneficial because the 
separation finally allows each one to be understood on its own terms, and without 
interference from the other. Capturing those divergent understandings was the 
purpose of this paper. It is not the end, though, because rendering fairness and 
solidarity as incomparable also implies a disorientation that will need to be managed 
elsewhere: it is impossible to explain why one should be privileged over the other. 
Those forced to decide between them will have to judge not despite imperfect 
justification, but because of the impossibility of any justification at all.  
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